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DUTY OF LIABILITY INSURER TO COMPROMISE
LITIGATION
By JOHN A. APPLEmAN*
Members of the general public often fail to undestand
the relationship of the insurance company to its policyholders
and their mutual rights and duties. The insured pays a premium for protection against legal liability. If an accident
occurs, he expects that a complete investigation shall be made
of all circumstances surrounding the accident; and, after such
investigation is made, if the circumstances disclose that the
insured is at fault, then he expects that the case will be compromised and settled out of court, if possible. If a reasonable
settlement is not possible, then the insured expects the company
to defend any litigation arising therefrom at its own expense
and pay any and all judgments recovered, up to the policy
limits. These matters, simply stated, constitute the rights and
duties arising under the usual form of automobile liability
insurance policy. 1
But, as simple as this matter appears upon surface examination, a closer scrutiny reveals powerful and conflicting undercurrents. In the first place, nearly all accidents result in a
conflict of testimony as to the acts of each individual concerned
and a definite dispute upon issues of negligence. It is impossible
to accurately forecast the verdict of a jury. Suppose, then, the
insurance company is confident that the policyholder was not
at fault but the jury decides otherwise. Or suppose that the
* Member of the Bloomington, Illinois, Bar. Author of AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE (1937), Callaghan & Company (in
publication); Automobile Insurance and the Declaratory Judgment,
American Bar Association Journal, July, 1937; Special Phases of the
Omnibus Clause, American Bar Association Journal, September, 1936;
The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, American Bar Association Journal, January, 1936; Sleeping at the Wheel, Iowa Law Review,
March, 1937; Special Phases of the Family Purpose Doctrine, Tennessee Law Review, December, 1936; and other articles.
the standard policy, this clause reads as follows: "It is
.In
further agreed that as respects insurance afforded by this policy [under
coverages A and B] the company shall (a) defend in his name and
behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction
and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company shall have the right to make
such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as
may be deemed expedient by the company."
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insurer can settle the case for $8,500 but from past experience
knows that in 90% of such cases the jury verdict will not
exceed $5,000, but this particular jury return a verdict of
$15,000. Is the insurer to be penalized for this failure to
accurately "call its shots" ?
By the terms of one section of the standard liability policy,
previously noted, the insurer has the right to compromise or to
settle any claims which it may feel advisable. In another
section of the policy the right to make any settlements or compromises is unequivocally taken away from the insured. 2 It
has been held that the insurance company is not bound to consult the insured's interests in making a settlement. 3 Difficulty
seldom arises in connection with the privileges asserted, but
rather in relation to the duty of the insurer to effect a settlement in a controverted case. No question will arise if a resulting judgment is less than the policy limits. If, however, the
judgment exceeds the policy limits the policyholder gets a sharp,
sinking sensation in the pit of his stomach and grasps wildly
about for some method of preventing his personal financial loss.
Let us look at the matter from the viewpoint of the policyholder, for a moment. He has paid for a certain amount of
protection, let us say, $10,000 and $20,000 limits. This means
that the insurer will pay judgments up to a limit of $10,000
for any one person injured but will not pay in excess of $20,000
regardless of the number of persons injured in the accident.
The policyholder has an accident in which four or five people
are injured. The plaintiff's attorney offers to settle all cases
for $15,000. This seems like a large sum of money to the policy2Under the Assistance and Cooperation clause of the standard
policy is found: "The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense
other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as
shall be imperative at the time of the accident." See the cases of
Snyder v. National Union Indemnity Co., C. C. A. 10th, 65 F. (2d) 844
(1933), cert. denied 291 U. S. 665, 54 S. Ct. 440, 78 L. Ed. 1056; Universal Auto Insurance Co. v. Culberson, Tex. Civ. App., 54 S. W. (2d)
1061 (1932).
3
"An insurance company, under a policy such as the declaration
discloses, has an absolute right to dispose of an action brought against
its assured and by him turned over to it to defend or, at its option, to
settle, In such way as may appear to it for its best interests. It is not
bound 'to consult the interest of the assured to the prejudice of its
own interests in case of a conflict between the two'; and the fact of
protest by the insured is immaterial." Long v. Union Indemnity Co.,
277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931).
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holder but he requests the insurer to pay it. After all, it is
less than the policy limits so why gamble? By making such
a gamble the policyholder may be exposed to the risk of a large
excess verdict. The insurer, however, reasons differently. If
the policy limits are only $20,000 it is only gambling an extra
$5,000 as against a certain $15,000 loss; whereas, if the cases are
battled, they may result in a defendant's verdict or a total
judgment of only $6,000 or $7,000. This is certainly not
unusual. Certainly this illustration serves to point out the
sharp conflict of interests between the parties. Each party
is looking out solely for himself, and the true cause of justice
must be to find some doctrine or rule of law which will most
adequately protect the interests of both parties in the majority
of cases. Let us examine the present status of the law as to the
existence of some sound principle in this regard.
As a general proposition, it is admitted that the insurance
company has absolute authority to make any settlement within
the policy limits. The insured can neither force the insurer
to make a settlement nor can he prevent the company from
compromising claims or litigation. 4 If the settlement proposed
is one in excess of the policy limits, and it is expected that the
insured will pay such additional amount, the consent of the
insured must first be had. 5
4

"The insurance contract between defendant and the company Is
an indemnity contract. The reason why absolute authority is given
the insurer in the matter of settlements with claimants against the
insured is obvious. And the authority of the insurer as to this is
absolute. Best Building Co., Inc. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
Ltd., et al., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911, 71 A. L. R. 1464. The insured
cannot compel the insurer to settle nor prevent it from doing so."
Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y. S. 744 (1934). See
also New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. East Tennessee Telephone Co.,
C. C. A. 6th, 139 Fed. 602 (1905), New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 114 La. Sup. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905); Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931); Silverstein v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., 175 App. DiV. 639, 162 N. Y. S.601 (1916); Auerbach
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 263 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923); Schmidt
& Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653
(1914).
5 "Thus the obligation of the insurance company was to defend the
suit in the name of the assured, or 'settle same'. The contract does
not contain any provision in respect to how or through what agency
the insurance company should either defend or settle. Those were
matters for its own determination. It might settle the suit through
its attorneys, or through some local or general agent, or by some agent
specially appointed. It was a corporation, and could act only through
some agency. The assured was not at all concerned, provided the set-
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In accordance with the above doctrine, it has been stated
that the contract must be enforced according to its terms. Consequently, if no principle of public policy is violated, there is
no liability on the part of the insurer at all for failure to make
a settlement. 6 And if the insured voluntarily makes a settlement without written consent of the insurer, the company is
under no obligation to reimburse him for this expense.7
What, then, is the nature of the obligation of the insurance
company with reference to the making of a settlement ? It has
been often contended by litigants that the insurance company is
under a duty to elect--either to compromise a case if it can
be accomplished within the policy terms, or to defend, and, if
it elects to defend it assumes all risk of the judgment exceeding
the policy limits. Every court considering this question has held
that the mere refusal to settle a case does not of itself increase
the limits of the policy so as to bind an insurer for a judgment
in excess of the policy limits.8 Some courts have refused to
tlement did not exceed the indemnity for which the insurer was liable,
as to how or by whom it should settle any suit it was contractually
bound to defend or settle. This defense it was to make in the name
of the assured, and implied an obligation to defend in good faith.
Inasmuch as its own liability was limited it was bound to take
care that no unnecessary liability was cast upon the assured by a negligent defense. So with its obligation to settle. So long as it should
settle within the limit of its contractual obligation, the assured was not
concerned. But a settlement in excess of that would require the
consent of the assured, who would have to pay the excess. To enable
the Insurance company to defend or settle, the assured was required,
upon request, 'to aid in securing information and evidence and in effecting settlements'. But this was the extent of the right of the assured
In the matter of settlements, unless it should make a settlement of its
own on volition. In this case it could not call upon the insurer for
reimbursement unless its action in settling a claim was done with the
consent of the insurer 'previously given in writing'." New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. East Tennessee Telephone Co., C. C. A. 6th, 139 Fed.
602 (1905).
a Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574,
43 Atl. 503 (1899).
7New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. East Tennessee Telephone Co.,
C. C. A. 6th, 139 Fed. 602 (1905); Thatcher v. -ltna Accident & Life
Co., C. C. A. 8th, 287 Fed. 484 (1923); Kesinger v. Commercial Standard
Ins. Co., 70 P. (2d) 776 (Colo., 1937).
""The only suggestion of a tortious act is in the language used
with reference to the defendant's negligently refusing to settle the
Jones claim for $1,000 or $2,500. A casual examination of the policy
makes it clear that the parties agreed that the defendant should have
the sole right to compromise and settle claims brought against the
plaintiff. There is no allegation that this power was exercised by the
defendant fraudulently, oppressively, or otherwise than in good faith.
That provision was evidently placed in the contract for the protection
of the insurer and gives the insurer the right to exercise its own judg-
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impose liability upon the insurer, rejecting in toto contentions
made by the insured-and the strength of the language used
made it appear that even fraud or bad faith would not create
a liability for such failure. Undoubtedly, those decisions were
merely worded without considering possible consequences, and
equity would always consider the element of fraud, if an action
of quasi-contract were mainainted. At any rate all courts now
agree that under certain circumstances liability may be imposed
upon the insurer for failure to compromise. Let us see what
circumstances must be shown.
RULE OF BAD FuT

The old majority rule which is now rapidly becoming the
minority rule holds that in order for the insured to recover
against the company for failure to settle he must show actual
fraud or bad faith on its part. 9 It is not sufficient that there
ment as to when a compromise and a settlement shall be made. Of
course, it must be exercised in good faith and without any wrongful or
fraudulent purpose. When properly exercised, it is binding upon the
insured. It turns out that it would have been better for all parties,
the plaintiff as well as the defendant, if the offer of a compromise had
been accepted, but, as is said in the brief of the counsel for the defendant, 'This is a case where hindsight turns out to be better than foresight.' It was a mistake of judgment, something not unusual in the
affairs of this life. Such a mistake, honestly made, does not subject
the person to legal liability." Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946 (1917).
See also Kingan & Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N. E. 348 (1917); Georgia
Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777 (1932); Schenke
Piano Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 216 N. Y. 687, 110 N. E. 1049
(1915); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E.
577 (1923); Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Co., 247
N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911 (1928); Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653 (1914).
9"Some of the cases hold that the insured is entitled to recover
upon proof that the insurer in refusing to settle a claim for damages
was guilty of negligence. In so far as any standard of due care may
be applied to the exercise of an honest judgment in accepting or refusing an offer of compromise, the test is rejected in the better reasoned
cases, and we think rightly so. The practical difficulties in applying
such standard are at once suggested by the rhetorical question in the
Best Building Co. case, supra, 'We may ask what would constitute negligence in the failure to settle a case, as distinguished from bad faith',
and by the laconic observation of the Kentucky Court in Georgia
Casualty Company v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777, 779, 'The
gift of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals'."
Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., C. C. A. 6th, 68 F. (2d) 808
(1934).
See also American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, C. C. A. 5th,
61 F. (2d) 446 (1932), this decision approving the test of bad faith,
but specifically reserves passing upon the test of negligence; Bartlett
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might be danger of an excessive verdict, or that the question of
liability was one closely controverted. It is not sufficient that
hindsight reveals that a settlement would have been wise, nor
even that foresight suggests it to some extent. The insured has
no right to assume that the insurance company is blessed with
a gift of prophecy so as to fortell the result of a hard-fought
case.10 Nor is the insurer required to assume the plaintiff's
witnesses will be believed in preference to its own. 1 While a test
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 Atl. 180 (1933); Georgia
Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777 (1932); Davis v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 16 La. App. 253, 133 So. 769 (1931); City of
Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N. W. 643 (1929);
Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211
N. W. 317 (1926); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills Products
Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931); Schenke Piano Co. v. Philadelphia
Casualty Co., 216 N. Y. 662, 110 N. E. 1049 (1915); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923); Best Building
Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Co., 247, N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911
(1928); Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269,
91 S. E. 946 (1917); Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., Vt.,
187 Atl. 788 (1936); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162
Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081 (1916), this result having been changed by
later cases.
a "In order to deal with the question from a more practical point
of view, let us suppose that in this very case the insurance company
had authorized its local counsel to defend or settle. Would it be contended for a moment that, although he exercised an honest judgment
after ascertaining the facts, the company could recover of him the
excess over what the case could have been compromised for on the
ground that he failed to make the right choice? Clearly not. The gift
of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals, and as yet
their vision has not reached such a state of perfection that they have
the power to predict what will be the verdict of the jury on disputed
facts In a personal injury case. The verdict represents the composite
judgment of the assenting jurors, and oftentimes is but the resultant
expression of conflicting views. Common experience teaches us that,
even where the injuries would justify a more substantial verdict, some
of the jurors, doubting whether there is any liability at all, are not
willing to go that far, but insist on the verdict as returned. Calling
it negligence for an agent not to divine what would be the result of a
jury trial on disputed evidence, and permitting a jury to determine the
question not solely on the facts as presented to him, but in the light of
the subsequent verdict of the jury, would carry his responsibility
beyond the bounds of reason and further than the demands of justice
require. There is no reason why a different rule should apply to the
case in hand. The facts were investigated, the evidence on the question of liability was conflicting, and the most that can be said is that,
in refusing to settle, the insurance company committed a mere error
of judgment for which it cannot be held liable." Georgia Casualty
Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777 (1932).
' "We may ask what would constitute negligence in the failure to
settle a case, as distinguished from bad faith. Even when there was
little likelihood of recovery many reasonable persons would think it
wise to settle rather than to take any chance with a jury. In most of
the accident cases, disputed questions of fact arise. Is the insurance

L. J.-3
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of negligence might be perfectly legitimate theoretically, the
test of bad faith seems one more capable of practical administration. If the insurer believes it can defeat a claim for
damages, it certainly is not bad faith to defend rather than to
compromise even though a timid person might be inclined to
12
settle.
If the insured does bring suit against the insurer alleging
fraud or bad faith in its refusal or failure to settle, then the
burden rests upon the insured to prove such allegations. At
no time is this burden shifted to the company. 13 It has been held
that bad faith may be shown where the insurer appeals after
judgment where the case could have been settled within the
policy limits.' 4 This is clearly not the majority rule, as will
be later seen.
RULE OF NEGLIGENCE

The application and scope of the rule of negligence is
somewhat difficult to distinguish from that of bad faith. The
best way to make the distinction is probably somewhat as follows:
Under the rule previously discussed the intention of the insurer
must be bad-involving a fraudulent intent or bad faith. Under
the rule now presented this intention may be entirely lacking.
The courts hold that the insured surrenders a valuable right
to the insurance company by permitting it to assume entire
control of the defense of an action and over negotiations for
settlement. By so divesting himself of this privilege, he is
entitled to expect something in return. He is entitled to expect
company to determine at its peril whether reasonable-minded men
would believe the plaintiff's witnesses in preference to its own? Again,
even on conceded facts, as frequently happens, a serious question of law
arises as to the nature or extent of liability, if any. Is a jury to say
that the insurance company was guilty of negligence in choosing to try
out such a question in the courts rather than to settle? These questions suggest the wisdom of adhering to the contract of insurance which
the parties have made. If the insurance company is to be obligated to
make a settlement under any given circumstances, it must be a matter
to be dealt with between the insured and the insurer, or else regulated
by the Legislature." Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assur.
Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. B. 911 (1928).
"City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225
N. W. 643 (1929).
"Getchell & Martin Lumber Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Co.,
117 Ia. 180, 90 N. W. 616 (1902); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N. W. 643 (1929); Johnson v. Hardware Mutual
Casualty Co., Vt., 187 Atl. 788 (1936).
':Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170
S. E. 346 (1933).
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that the company will not only act in good faith but that it will
use due care and caution in negotiations and in settlement. If,
under the circumstances, a reasonable man would settle the case
rather than risk a trial the insurer would be guilty of negligence
by acting otherwise. 15
""Terms which are not strictly convertible or synonymous have
been used by different courts to indicate the same thing. Negligence
has been used by some courts to mean the same thing that other courts
have designated as bad faith. Bad faith, especially, is a term of variable significance and rather broad application. Generally speaking,
good faith means being faithful to one's duty or obligation; bad faith
means being recreant thereto. In order to understand what is meant
by bad faith, a comprehension of one's duty is generally necessary,
and we have concluded that we can best indicate the circumstance
under which the insurer may become liable to the insured by failure
to settle by giving with some particularity our conception of the duty
which the written contract of insurance imposes upon the carrier.
"In express terms the contract imposes no duty at all a breach of
which makes the insurer liable to the insured for a failure to settle or
compromise a claim. However, all courts are agreed that the insurer
does owe to the insured some duty in this respect. This duty is implied as a correlative duty growing out of certain rights and privileges
which the contract confers upon the insurer. By the terms of this
contract the absolute control of the defense of such actions is turned
over to the insurer, and the insured is excluded from any interference
in any negotiations for settlement or legal procedure. It is generally
understood that these are rights and privileges which it is necessary
for the insurer to have in order to justify or enable it to assume the
obligations which it does in the contract of insurance. So long as the
recovery does not exceed the limits of the insurance, the question of
whether the claim be compromised or settled, or the manner in which
it shall be defended, is a matter of no concern to the insured. However, where an injury occurs for which a recovery may be had in a
sum exceeding the amount of the insurance, the interest of the
insured becomes one of concern to him. At this point a duty on the
part of the insurer to the insured arises. It arises because the insured
has bartered to the insurance company all of the rights 'possessed by
him to enable him to discover the extent of the injury and to protect
himself as best he can from the consequences of the injury. He has
contracted with the insurer that it shall have the exclusive right to
settle or compromise the claim, to conduct the defense, and that he
will not interfere except at his own cost and expense. It is quite
apparent that this right was given to the insurance company to induce
it to enter into the contract of insurance, and that it is a necessary
right to be possessed by it if it is to write the insurance upon the
terms stipulated. It is a right to be exercised by the insurer in its
own interest.
"It is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judgment upon
the question of whether the claim should be settled or contested. But
because it has taken over this duty, and because the contract prohibits
the insured from settling, or negotiating for a settlement, or interfering in any manner except upon the request of the insurer, such as
assisting in the securing of witnesses, etc., its exercise of this right
should be accompanied by considerations of good faith. Its decision
not to settle should be an honest decision. It should be the result of
the weighing of probabilities in a fair and honest way. If upon such
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This argument is not without merit. The policy of insurance is supposedly designed solely for one purpose-that is,
for the protection of the policyholder. An insurance company
should not be permitted to gamble with his financial security
merely because it cannot beat the settlement down to a point
where it desires to settle. Assume that the limit of liability is
$5,000. If the insurer knows that the injuries are very bad
and that the chances are ten to one a verdict will be recovered,
it is clearly negligent in spurning an offer of $4,500 where the
verdict may run from $8,500 to $25,000. There is, in such a
case, which arises on thousands of occasions, good reason to say
that the insurer does not act in good faith because of such
negligence-regardless of the real intention of the company's
representative.
The consistency of this rule is evident when it is considered
that the insurer may be held liable for negligence in conducting
a defense. If it fails to exercise due care in the conduct of the
defense and handles it in such a negligent and unskillful manner
consideration it decides that its interest will be better promoted by
contesting than by settling the claim, the insured must abide by what-

ever consequences :fow from that decision. He has so agreed. But,
as already stated, such decision should be an honest and intelligent
one. It must be honest and intelligent if it be a good-faith conclusion.
In order that it be honest and intelligent it must be based upon a
knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which liability is predIcated, and upon a knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries
so far as they reasonably can be ascertained.
"This requires the insurance company to make a diligent effort
to ascertain the facts upon which only an intelligent and good-faith
judgment may be predicated. If it exhausts the sources of information
open to it to ascertain the facts, it has done all that is possible to
secure the knowledge upon which a good-faith judgment may be exercised. But we do not go so far as to say that, in order to characterize
its judgment as one of good faith, it is necessary that it should
absolutely exhaust all sources of information. We go only so far as to
say, that it should exercise reasonable diligence in this behalf, which
means such diligence as the great majority of persons use in the same
or similar circumstances. This is ordinary care. So it seems to us
that the statement in the opinion, which is criticised, to the effect that
a good-faith decision on the part of the insurance company upon the
question of settlement must be preceded by the exercise of that degree
of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence
would exercise in the investigation and adjustment of claims, states
the duty devolving upon the insurer, just as we declare it to be."
Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co. of Ft. Scott, Kansas, 204
Wis. 1, 235 N. W. 413 (1931).
"It may be stated as a rule of law that where an insurance company agrees to indemnify against loss from personal injury claims, conditioned upon insured's surrendering to the insurance company control
of investigations, adjustments of claims, and defenses of lawsuits, and
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that a large verdict is returned against the insured, courts have
permitted a recovery. 16
The real difficulty in this test lies in one proposition, and
that, to the writer, totally destroys it efficacy. It is unworkable
in actual practice. The question is submitted to a jury of 12
men, none of whom have any legal training whatsoever, nor any
experience of any nature with insurance claims or litigation.
Under the circumstances those men are totally incompetent to say
whether or not a certain offer of settlement was reasonable.
They are incompetent to estimate the probable chances of recovery. In no sense of the word could any of those men be
considered a judge capable of analyzing the actions of the company to determine whether or not under the circumstances negligence was shown. To submit such a proposition to a body of
unqualified and untrained men is not only grossly unjust and
inequitable, but it amounts to making a new contract for the
parties. There can be no practical justification for the operation
where the insurance company does, pursuant to such contract, take
control of such matters, a relationship arises between insured and
Insurer which imposes on the insurer the duty owing to the insured
to exercise skill, care, and good faith to the end of saving the insured
harmless, as contemplated by the contract to indemnify. The insurer
must act honestly to effectually indemnify and save the insured harmless as it has contracted to do-to the extent, if necessary, that it must
make whatever payment and settlement an honest judgment and discretion dictate, within the limits of the policy, and an abandonment of
this duty to act subsequent to its assumption in part constituted bad
faith." Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 Pac.
(2d) 916 (1935).
See also Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting
Co., C. C. A. 8th, 32 F. (2d) 425 (1929); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook.
O'Brien Construction Co., C. C. A. 8th, 69 F. (2d) 462 (1934); Ballard
v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., C. C. A. 7th, 86 F. (2d) 449 (1936);
Atteboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573
(1917); Bartlett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 AtI. 180
(1933); Hoyt v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of America, 120
Conn. 156, 179 Atl. 842 (.1935); Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident,
Fire & Life Assurance Co., 79 N. H. 186, 106 Atl. 604 (1919); Douglas
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 At. 708
(1924); Street Coal Co. v. Frankfort General Ins. Co., 237 N. Y. 60, 142
N. E. 352 (1923), although this case has probably been overruled by

more recent decisions; Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,

EL70 S. C. 286, '170 S.E. 346 (1933); Aycock gosiery Mills v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S.W. (2d) 889 (1928); Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Culberson, Tex. Civ. App., 54 S.W. (2d) 1061 (1932).
'aBaallard v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., C. C. A- 7th, 86 F.
(2d) 449 (1936); Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Ind. App.
301, 115 N. E. 348 (1917); Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty
Co., Tenn., 11 S.W. (2d) 889 (1928); Schwartz v. Norwich Union Indemnity Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250 N. W. 446 (1933).
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of the rule and it is to be hoped that it will be extended no
court, more justification would appear. Even in that situation,
further. If it were handled entirely as a matter of law by the
however, the average judge has no experience with casualty
claims or litigation and has no basis upon which to form a
sound judgment. It must be remembered that an insurance
company will not gamble without justification-and an incident
of the type referred to would create ill will, and serve as sales
ammunition to representatives of other companies. That alone
serves as an effective cheek upon any negligent propensities, and
the right to contest controverted issues should not be further
restricted.
There is no serious question that the propositions of either
bad faith or negligence are for the jury to determine. 17 The
writer challenges the competency of the jury to decide this
issue. Of course, if there is no real evidence of negligence, the
court will direct a verdict for the insurer. It has been held
evidence of negligence to delay acting upon an offer of compromise submitted by the plaintiff until that offer is withdrawn.' s
The split in authority among the various Federal courts
may appear somewhat confusing to the reader. As a matter of
fact, one Federal case has stated that it feels the rule established
in the state where it is located is to be followed. 19 That may
account in part for the distinction. Another reason may lie in
17"Defendant earnestly contends that there is no proof of negligence on its part in and about the negotiations for compromise and

settlement and the defense of the action. We think there was proof

sufficient to take the case to the jury, to be found in the letters per-

taining to the various offers and counter-offers of settlement and in
the testimony of T. S. Adams.

The force of that evidence was solely

a question for the jury. It was not, therefore, error to refuse to direct
a verdict on this ground.
"Defendant further contends that there is no proof of the allega-

tion that defendant acted in bad faith in its conduct of the negotiations for settlement and its conduct of the defense. This, too, was a
question for the jury to decide. It heard all the testimony, and might
well be left to decide whether the letters and oral testimony showed
that defendant conducted the negotiations with an eye solely to its
own interests and in disregard of plaintiff's rights and interests."
Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170
S. E. 346 (1933). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cooke-O'Brien
Construction Co., C. C. A. 8th, 69 F. (2d) 462 (1934); Lanferman v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 'Wis., 267 N. W. 300 (1936).
1 Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C. 286, 170
S. E. S46 (1933).
"Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., C. C. A. 7th, 86 F.
(2d) 449 (1936).
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the fact that the minority view is supported by language in
these cases which is, in reality, very little different from the
majority result-inasmuch as the court finds bad faith to exist
where due care is not observed.
Here we have two tests enunciated the courts. Each has
been bitterly attacked by writers and by judges. There is
little distinction to be found in some decisions which apparently
regard both tests to have the same essential elements. The one
real point of vulnerability is existent under both-that is, the
consideration of the question as a jury issue. No jury whatsoever is competent to consider such an issue when even attorneys,
expert in the fields of personal injury and insurance law, might
well differ upon the the questions of due care by or good faith of
the insurer in such a situation. A group of laymen, casually
assembled, is absolutely incompetent to apply either test accurately; and a group of laymen will always be biased in favor
of a plaintiff, who is likewise a layman, as against an insurance
company.
The writer has no fault to find with either theory, as such.
'Which test is applied must depend upon the feeling of the courts
in the particular jurisdiction in question. The one real improvement which the courts could make in this regard is to treat the
question as one of law, wherever possible, rather than one of fact.
If no bad faith is shown and no negligence displayed, then the
matter was purely a discretionary one, and the fact that the
insurer guessed wrong should have no effect whatsoever upon
the issue. As the courts of Kentucky have so aptly declared:
"The gift of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary
mortals, and as yet their vision has not reached such a state of
perfection that they have the power to predict what will be the
verdict of the jury upon disputed facts in a personal injury
case."
If courts will refuse to shunt matters of this nature
to a jury where there is little or no evidence to support a verdict,
and will courageously express themselves upon these questions
of law then equity and justice will be worked toward all parties.
When, as in many cases, it appears that the insurer gambled
unfairly with the policyholder's chances a verdict could likewise be directed for the plaintiff as a matter of law. Only by
direct and fearless action of the courts themselves can fair
and equitable results be reached.

